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The objective of this project is to educate joint senior leaders on the importance of 
the strategic effects of operational contract support (OCS). Contracting for goods and 
services in the contingency operational environment is a mission-enabling necessity; 
however, analyzing the strategic effects of contracting is not well practiced and rarely 
understood by military leaders—from lieutenants to generals. Commanders in the field 
are taught to think of the costs literally, as tax dollars spent to enhance mission 
effectiveness. However, the less literal costs and the associated effects of choosing to 
contract for goods or services are largely ignored. This project explores the use of OCS in 
contingency environments, and the positive and negative effects OCS decisions have on 
the larger, strategic military mission, and on other instruments of power. The case studies 
and vignettes developed by this research examine how second- and third-order OCS 
effects impact the United States’ military mission and general interests. The products 
developed during the course of this project consist of case studies and vignettes for use in 
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A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this project are to develop OCS case studies and vignettes for 
use in intermediate, senior, and flag officer or general officer levels of JPME coursework 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions [CJCSI], 2015). These case studies 
and vignettes will explore the major functions of OCS: contract support integration, 
contracting support, and contractor management. The role of each joint staff function in 
planning and executing OCS will be studied and the potential positive and negative, 
second- and third-order effects of OCS on the strategic mission and on the instruments of 
national power will be assessed. Teaching guides are provided to facilitate student 
exercises and discussion. The lessons from these case studies and vignettes will educate 
and empower future operational commanders to use OCS effectively as an economic 
weapon in contingency environments.   
B. BACKGROUND 
OCS is a capability that has roots as far back as the Revolutionary War. Through 
time, OCS has morphed from providing support functions to fulfilling major portions of 
the strategic military mission. In more recent times, a spotlight on OCS has illuminated 
the potential of this capability while also highlighting potential pitfalls. This background 
will explore the history of OCS, how it evolved to its current form, and the role and 
effects of OCS today.  
1. The Origins of OCS 
Throughout the history of the U.S. military, contractors have been an 
indispensable part of the Total Force. During the American Revolution, the ratio of 
military personnel to contractors was 6:1 (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 
n.d.b). Contractors were hired as wagon drivers, engineers; and were asked to supply 
weapons, beef, and clothing for soldiers. During the 19th century, contractors provided 
troop transport to Mexico for the Mexican-American War and throughout the continental 
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U.S. during the American Civil War. In the 20th century, local national contractors were 
used to provide supplies and services to Americans while abroad in Europe, Korea, and 
the South Pacific. Most recently, the ratio of contractors has grown to exceed military 
personnel. In the recent war in Afghanistan, there were 1.42 contractors to every military 
member (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, n.d.b). This large increase in the 
amount of contracted support on the battlefield fostered the OCS doctrine found today in 
Joint Publication (JP) 4–10 and in current legislation, regulations, and guidance.  
2. OCS Gaining Momentum 
OCS was initiated as a concept in October of 2007 when. Jacques Gansler, the 
chairman for the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations, published a report suggesting urgent reform of the U.S. 
Army’s expeditionary contracting due to issues and lessons learned from contracting 
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shortly following, the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2008 established a Commission on Wartime 
Contracting (COWC) to study federal agency contingency contracting and required the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to analyze the Gansler Commission recommendations to 
improve the DOD’s acquisition workforce (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 
n.d.a).  
Following the implementation of Gansler’s recommendations, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), as well as Congress, kept the DOD OCS program under 
close review. In September 2012, the House of Representatives’ Committee for Armed 
Forces of the 112th Congress held a hearing to identify and discuss several OCS 
capability gaps as a result of the CWOC and GAO investigations within Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Operational Contract Support, 2012). The Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC), a requirements validation committee under DOD Acquisition, reviewed 
numerous reports, legislation, and commission findings during and prior to the hearing 
and identified an OCS education and training gap. Specifically, the DOD Acquisition 
Corps, and equally importantly, non-acquisition DOD personnel, did not possess the 
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required knowledge to properly plan, utilize, and manage contracted support as a part of 
the Total Force package.   
As reliance on contracted support grew heavily during Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the DOD found itself unprepared to 
plan for and manage such a large contractor community. This shortfall led to many of the 
issues identified in the COWC and GAO reports on OCS, such as fraud, cost overruns, 
poor contractor performance, and hindering mission success.   
The congressional hearing and JROC findings ultimately led to legislative change 
codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2151(a), which made OCS a required part of the JPME curricula: 
“The subject matter to be covered by joint professional military education shall include at 
least the following: (1) National Military Strategy (2) Joint planning at all levels of war 
(3) Joint doctrine (4) Joint command and control (5) Joint force and joint requirements 
development (6) Operational contract support.”  In order to bridge the knowledge gap 
between contingency operations and OCS, and to meet the intent of the new law, the 
Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4) OCS and Services Division (OCSSD) requested the 
development of OCS-specific case studies and vignettes to include in all JPME programs. 
Development of these case studies and vignettes is the main objective and deliverable of 
this MBA project.   
3. Other OCS Initiatives 
Since the September 2012 hearing, several other initiatives have surfaced to build 
a more robust acquisition knowledge base across all DOD personnel, ranks, and 
functions. The J4 created the Operational Contract Support and Services Division 
(renamed to the Operational Contract Support Division in 2016), which continues to 
develop and update Joint Publication 4–10, Operational Contract Support. In addition, the 
division provides joint training and exercise opportunities for both DOD acquisition and 
non-acquisition personnel; including the Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course for 
geographic combatant commander support staff, and the Operational Contract Support 
Joint Exercise for the larger joint workforce. Operational Contract Support Integration 
Cells (OCSICs) were also established to provide centralized points of contact for 
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integrating all OCS matters under geographic combatant commanders, joint task forces, 
and service components (JP 4–10, 2014). Other initiatives include Joint Knowledge 
Online courses, additional Defense Acquisition University courses, changes to 
regulations and instructions, additional training funds for acquisition and non-acquisition 
personnel for OCS classes, and requiring OCS topics in the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
the National Military Strategy, Operation Plans, and Contingency Plans (Adams, 2015).   
4. The Role and Effects of OCS Today and Beyond 
OCS is an economic weapon that must be planned for, used, and managed like 
any other tactical or strategic weapon. Between FY2007 and FY2016, the DOD obligated 
$220 billion worth of contracts for various supplies and services within Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This large sum of money acts as a powerful tool to either dramatically 
increase mission effectiveness, or drastically hinder operations. In terms of personnel, 
contractors accounted for over 50% of the battle space throughout both wars (Peters, 
2016). The specific numbers comparing DOD personnel to U.S. and local national 
support contractors can be seen by referencing the Congressional Research Service’s 
report, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
2007–2016 (2016). In this report, the total number of contractors consistently 
outnumbered the number of troops on ground, and toward the end of each war, the ratio 
of contractors to troops increased from 1:1, to 2:1, and even to 3:1.    
With contractors becoming the majority of personnel in these conflicts, and 
accounting for a large sum of the wartime budget, training DOD personnel to plan for, 
use, and manage contractor personnel and the subsequent contracts is paramount as the 
capabilities provided by these contractors leads to mission success or failure. Contractors 
are fulfilling more and more roles in U.S. military conflicts, and requirements are only 
growing in size and complexity. This trend is expected to continue in the future, stressing 
the need for a trained force to plan and manage contracted capabilities.   
To maximize effectiveness, OCS should be included in the Joint Operational 
Planning Process (JOPP), in particular during the deliberate planning process. The 
planning, utilization, and management of OCS can be summed up in the three major 
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functions of OCS: contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor 
management. Operational commanders must understand how OCS touches all joint 
functions, not just the J4 (or the contracting function under the J4). Each functional has a 
hand in planning for their own contracted support (to include requirements development 
and managing the contract once awarded), and must integrate their requirements into the 
mission plan in order to be a fully effective force (i.e., to ensure there are no mission 
gaps).    
OCS can be a strategic war-fighting capability when used properly, but can 
negatively affect the strategic mission if its effects are not appropriately analyzed 
beforehand. The first-order effects (e.g., contracted goods or services are/are not 
delivered as required) are often easy to identify and most commanders accept or mitigate 
any risks. However, there are numerous instances where secondary or tertiary effects 
surfaced that were not easily identified (or just not thought about), causing negative 
military, economic, political, and informational effects to the region as well as to U.S. 
interests.   
For example, take the case of the Base Operation Support Services (BOSS) 
contract at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, Africa. The BOSS contract provided all life 
support activities for the personnel assigned. The scope of the contract included food, 
water, minor construction, showers, toilet facilities, etc. Hundreds of local nationals were 
employed to perform these services. When the contract was near the end of its 
performance period, a senior military official helped plan the next BOSS contract by 
adjusting the requirement and helping to renegotiating the cost of the contract. When the 
new contract was awarded, the number of local nationals required was much smaller than 
the previous contract. A Djiboutian diplomat heard of the new BOSS contract award and 
took exception to the number of local nationals that were laid off; efforts were made to 
contact the President of the United States to address the issue.   
The situation resulted in the U.S. renegotiating the Status of Forces Agreement 
with Djibouti, to include a $20 million annual fee for the continued use of Camp 
Lemonnier. Prior to this situation, the Djiboutian government allowed the U.S. to use the 
camp free of charge. While the senior military official had the right intentions to save 
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money, the actions to reduce the contract had second- and third-order effects, which 
actually increased the amount of taxpayer dollars spent on the strategic mission in 
Djibouti. Further, the official’s actions altered the diplomatic and economic relationship 
between the U.S. and Djibouti.   
This story is one of many where military commanders and leaders utilize OCS, 
but do not fully understand the strategic effects of this multifaceted weapon, and how 
actions involving OCS can impact the instruments of power as well as U.S. interests (G. 
Broadwell, personal communication, October 12, 2015).    
In an environment where the U.S. military relies more heavily on contractors than 
ever before, educating and training military leaders about the proper use of OCS is 
paramount to making informed decisions that will provide long-term benefits to the 
military and U.S. interests. This project will highlight the positive (negative) effects of 
planning (not planning) for OCS, the roles of joint functions in executing OCS, and will 
provide insights for current and future joint leaders to enhance strategic mission 
effectiveness by leveraging the nation’s economic power. 
C. OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 
OCS is defined as the “planning, managing and integration of obtaining supplies, 
services and/or construction from commercial sources” (JP 4–10, 2014). The main 
principles from JP 4–10 that the case studies and vignettes will emphasize are below.   
 OCS has three major functions: Contract Support Integration, Contracting 
Support, and Contractor Management. 
 Every joint function has a role in OCS. 
 The effects of OCS are not limited to just the military; rather they reach into 
the other instruments of national power and into overarching national strategic 
objectives. 
 There are benefits, risks, costs, and considerations when including contractors 
as a part of the total force. 
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 Phase 01 activities and other OCS planning initiatives, or lack thereof, can 
have a significant impact on the mission and future OCS outcomes in later 
phases. 
 These principles are weaved into the case studies and vignettes to ensure the 
students fully grasp the ideas presented within the JP 4–10 (2014) doctrine.    
D. JPME OCS LEARNING OBJECTIVES 
The JPME institutions have an OCS Curriculum Development Guide developed 
by the J4 OCSSD, which outlines the learning areas and objectives for each level of 
JPME: intermediate, senior, and flag officer or general officer (FO/GO). These objectives 
are derived from the CJCSI 1800.01E, dated 29 May 2015, and are further detailed by the 
J4 OCSSD.   
1. Learning Objectives for Intermediate OCS JPME  
 Explain Service, Service component, and joint force commanders’ OCS 
planning and execution responsibilities and considerations for employment of 
contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) and non-CAAF, to 
include discussing risk to mission and risk to force. 
 Explain how commanders control OCS through requirements determination 
by establishing and executing OCS-related boards, centers, and cells. 
 Comprehend the OCS implications within strategic and operational guidance, 
policy and procedures for planning (2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 
Guidance for Employment of the Force, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Joint 
Operational Planning and Execution System and Adaptive Planning and 
Execution, CJCSM 3130.03). 
 Explain contract support integration capabilities to integrate OCS 
requirements into operational plans and orders to include the role and function 
of OCS Integration Cells at the Combatant Commander, Service component, 
and Joint Task Force levels. 
 Explain Service, agency, and joint force commander contractor management 
responsibilities for integrating contractors as an element of the Total Force to 
include theater entrance requirements, and in-theater accountability, oversight, 
                                                 
1 Phase 0 refers to the six-phase model for the continuum of military operations.  Per JP 5-0, Joint 
Operational Planning, Phase 0 is the shape phase of an operation, followed by Phases 1-5 which include 
deter, seize, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority (pp xxii-xxiv).  See pages 19-22 for further 
descriptions of the phases.  
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visibility, and the provision of government furnished support (GFS) (G. 
Broadwell, personal communications, October 12, 20152). 
2. Learning Objectives for Senior OCS JPME  
 Analyze the evolution, purpose, principles, and challenges of OCS in enabling 
joint force operations. 
 Interpret strategic implications of substituting contracted capability for forces 
in national security missions across the full range of military operations and 
include an analysis of the benefits, risks, costs, and considerations (to include 
implications of “inherently governmental” as defined in Section 5 of the 
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act) for the Total Force. 
 Examine the strategic and operational planning and execution implications of 
using external versus theater support contracts. 
 Examine how private sector capability has adapted to changing strategic and 
operational environments to include an analysis of how resourcing and 
prioritization affect national strategies and operational options. 
 Examine a commander’s options to achieve effects by considering resource 
management (e.g., integrated financial operations, formally known as “money 
as a weapon system”) and efforts such as the commander’s emergency 
response program (CERP) in OCS planning. 
 Comprehend how to leverage joint, Service, and agency OCS capabilities to 
support commanders and staffs to enhance operational effects, manage the 
requirements determination process, and avoid unintended consequences. 
 Assess the strategic effects of the infusion of large amounts of financial 
capital into a struggling economy (e.g., USFOR-A Task Force 2010) across 
the gamut of political, diplomatic, military, or economic power bases; include 
in the assessment OCS interagency implications (focus on the Departments of 
Justice [DoJ], State [DoS], and Commerce [DoC] in addition to DOD). 
 Comprehend legal, oversight, ethical, and cultural issues related to use of 
contractors in an operational setting. 
 Interpret the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and 
procurement integrity for the Department (G. Broadwell, personal 
communications, October 12, 2015). 
                                                 
2 These learning objectives were obtained from Mr. Gary Broadwell of the J4, Logistics Directorate, 
Operational Contract Support Division.  These objectives are in draft format and have not yet been 
published. 
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3. Learning Objectives for FO/GO OCS JPME  
 Interpret the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and 
procurement integrity for the Department. 
 Evaluate the strategic relevance of findings and shortfalls identified in various 
OCS related audit reports, commission findings, and legislation (Gansler, 
CWOC, and NDAA language).  
 Analyze the strategic and operational challenges for OCS in an interagency or 
multi-national/coalition environment to include the integration necessary to 
manage potentially competing requirements.   
 Assess the strategic effects of the infusion of large amounts of financial 
capital into a struggling economy (e.g., USFOR-A Task Force 2010) across 
the gamut of political, diplomatic, military, or economic power bases; include 
in the assessment OCS interagency implications (focus on the DOJ, DOS, and 
DOC in addition to DOD).   
 Analyze the findings and shortfalls identified in various OCS-related audit 
reports, commission findings, and legislation (Gansler, COWC, and NDAA 
language) and their operational lessons and implications to an operational 
commander.   
 Evaluate strategic implications of substituting contracted capability for forces 
in national security missions across the full range of military operations; 
include an analysis of the benefits, risks, costs, and considerations for the 
Total Force.  
 Assess the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and procurement 
integrity for the Department.   
 Assess cost consciousness and how to achieve effectiveness and economy of 
operation as they relate to employing OCS by considering the following:  
o Contracting related boards and theater business clearances 
o Achieving economies of scale by combining or coordinating requirements 
o Managing government-furnished support 
o Effects on other, less tangible costs of contracted support (e.g., contracting 
officer’s representatives [COR], escorts, opportunity costs, increased risks, 
or loss of flexibility) (G. Broadwell, personal communications, October 
12, 2015). 
The case studies and vignettes developed during this project reflect these learning 
objectives and satisfy JPME curriculum requirements. 
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E. JPME AUDIENCES AND DELIVERABLES 
The specific target in this project is educating all current and potential operational 
commanders. Operational commanders have staffs that oversee the contracting process, 
ensuring mission gaps are met through contracting; however, commanders are not 
viewing OCS holistically—they may not understand how their OCS-related decisions can 
have both positive and negative secondary or tertiary effects that go beyond meeting their 
capability gap (a primary effect). Further, they may not understand how those secondary 
and tertiary effects can affect achievement of their strategic mission objectives. It is 
important to note that this lack of understanding is not the fault of the commanders—it is 
highly likely they have received little to no OCS education, which prevents them from 
properly using the capability to meet their strategic objectives. This research aims to help 
rectify that problem. 
There are five different levels of JPME.  However JPME only encompasses the 
top three levels: intermediate, senior, and flag officer or general officer. The audience for 
intermediate JPME includes mid-grade officers and civilians (O-4 and GS-13). The 
curriculum typically focuses on war-fighting and leader development at the operational 
and tactical levels. For the intermediate JPME level, we developed a case study that 
focuses on the major functions of OCS, each functional’s responsibility for planning and 
managing OCS, and the implications of OCS on the instruments of national power at the 
operational and tactical levels (CJCSI, 2015). The associated teaching guide provides 
guidance for classroom exercises that emphasize these topics.   
The audience for senior JPME includes senior officers and civilians (O-5/O-6 and 
GS-14/GS-15). The curriculum for the senior level focuses on preparing students for 
strategic leadership, advisement, national security strategy, theater strategy and 
campaigning, civil-military relations, joint planning processes, joint interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and integration (CJCSI, 2015). For the 
senior JPME level, we developed a case study that focuses on the effects of OCS from an 
operational commander’s perspective. The case also explores the lingering implications 
of poor OCS planning on the overall campaign strategy and civil-military relationships. 
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The teaching guide includes discussion questions to encourage critical thinking and 
thoughtful interactions.   
The audience for the CAPSTONE and PINNACLE courses are FOs and GOs. 
The curriculum at this level focuses on preparing officers for high-level joint, 
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational leadership responsibilities, as well as 
grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, theater strategy, 
civil-military relations, and the conduct of campaigns and military operations in different 
environments to achieve national objectives and interests (CJCSI, 2015). For the FO/GO 
JPME level, we developed short vignettes that emphasize high-level joint challenges in 
planning for and executing OCS, and potential implications on military or national 
strategy. The teaching guide contains discussion questions to encourage thoughtful 
interactions. 
This introduction identified the objectives of this MBA project and provided a 
comprehensive background on the subject at hand: OCS. OCS has always been a military 
capability, but has more recently outgrown its minor support role and is now a major 
player in U.S. military conflicts. As with any growing capability, proper planning and 
management is required to effectively utilize OCS. After identifying some dangers and 
the potential of OCS, Congress has included OCS into JPME curricula to ensure current 
and future operational commanders can harness the power of OCS and use it to 
successfully meet strategic mission needs. This is the main goal of this project, to 
produce products that can be incorporated into JPME for the purposes of educating the 
force. The next chapter will review the literature that supports the themes and doctrine 








II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature related to OCS 
and the joint doctrine from which the themes of the case studies and vignettes are 
derived. First, we will cover the definition and scope of OCS, as defined by Joint 
Doctrine. Next, we will discuss joint operational planning and how OCS activities 
integrate into the planning process. Finally, we will review the instruments of national 
power and how OCS activities affect these instruments.   
B. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 
OCS is “the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and 
construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations” (JP 4–10, 2014). 
According to JP 4–10, Operational Contract Support (2014), there are three major 
functions of OCS: contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor 
management.   
1. Contract Support Integration  
Contract support integration (CSI) is the planning function, which involves 
balancing effectiveness with efficiency and addressing any associated risks in order to 
meet strategic goals. Proper planning allows the operational commander to understand 
how OCS can be a force multiplier that fills in where military support can no longer be 
supplied organically. Planning also allows the funding, mission, and procurement 
timelines to synchronize for effective and efficient outcomes that reduce the risks of cost 
overruns or poor performance. Finally, planning for OCS helps commanders meet their 
mission requirements. Properly planning for OCS during CSI is a theme found 
throughout all the case studies and vignettes for each JPME level (JP 4–10, 2014). 
All staff sections participate in CSI to identify their individual contract support 
needs, and to determine how other staff sections are affected by those needs. For 
example, the Operations (J-3) section may decide to contract out a portion of base 
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security. If those contracted personnel will be afforded basic life support functions (e.g., 
housing, hygiene facilities, dining privileges) or medical support, then Personnel (J-1), 
Logistics (J-4), and Medical (Surgeon) staff sections all need to account for the additional 
personnel they are responsible for supporting. Collaboration among functional expertise 
is completed through boards, centers or cells, and working groups. Requirements for 
contracted support are also developed, validated, and prioritized during CSI with the 
assistance of many staff functions.  
CSI also requires command and control structures to effectively outline the flow 
of communications and approvals (JP 4–10, 2014). The command and control structure is 
largely dependent on which service the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) 
designates as the lead service for contracting (LSC). The GCC could also designate the 
lead service for contracting coordination (LSCC) or a joint theater support contracting 
command (JTSCC), depending on the contingency (JP 4–10, 2014). Planning for how 
different services will fall in the command and control structure is crucial to meeting 
timelines efficiently and bridging gaps between different contracting processes.   
The challenge of CSI is anticipating the range of potential effects of outsourcing 
on elements beyond the mission and exploring mitigation plans for these situations. For 
example, the DOD outsourced the transportation of supplies in Afghanistan to local truck 
drivers in order to move U.S. troops to other duties. The contract met its intent, but had 
the unanticipated effect of local truck drivers paying off the enemy (warlords and the 
Taliban) to move military supplies through hostile territories. Clearly, this unanticipated 
effect was counter to the strategic mission.   
It is difficult to plan for these types of effects because planning for contracted 
support rarely takes into account the broader sociopolitical and economic environments. 
Commanders and their staffs have to learn to think through potential effects in the same 
way planners war-game different operational scenarios. It is easy to plan for the known 
factors, but much harder to plan for the unknowns, which often arise in the contingency 
environment. Due to information asymmetry, cross-functional planning and clear lines of 
communication are crucial to the success of CSI.  
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2. Contracting Support  
The second function of OCS is contracting support (CS). During CS, in-theater 
contracting is planned and coordinated through various offices with adherence to the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and applicable supplements, such as the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and service-specific supplements. 
This phase is executed by trained contracting officers and contract management 
personnel, with input from the end user (i.e., customer). Requirements are translated into 
contractual documents and administered until close out (JP 4–10, 2014).   
The customer’s role in this function is to maintain communication with the 
contracting staff to ensure the contract fulfills the end user’s intent and meets all their needs. 
Even when proper planning occurs, customer input throughout CS enables a consistent 
feedback loop to catch any discrepancies between the contract and the user’s intent.   
3. Contractor Management  
The last function of OCS is contractor management (CM). This function 
“involves the control, support, and integration of contractor personnel and their 
associated equipment deploying and operating in the operational area” (JP 4–10, 2014). 
Since this part of OCS focuses on the contractor, planning and executing duties that 
support the contractor must be considered. These considerations include pre-deployment 
preparation of contractor personnel, deployment and reception, in-theater management, 
redeployment, force protection and security, and contractor-provided security. Contractor 
management includes all staff functions, from planning, through contract performance.    
Just as the customer is vital to the success of CSI and CS, they are equally crucial 
to managing contractors effectively. The customer is the party receiving the goods or 
services, and is in the optimal position to monitor contractor performance. However, if 
the customer does not communicate contractor performance, the contracting staff cannot 
enforce standards or contract requirements. The customer has to initiate the feedback 
process during and throughout CM. In general, customer engagement is required 
throughout all functions of OCS: from the planning function of CSI, to contract 
development and execution in CS, and throughout post-award management during CM.   
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4. Joint Functionals’ Roles in OCS  
JP 4–10 emphasizes the fact that a multifunctional approach in planning for and 
executing OCS is vital to supporting the warfighter among all phases of military 
operations. Illuminating the functions of OCS is one of the main themes for the case 
studies and vignettes. Understanding the need for a multifaceted approach allows 
operational commanders to maximize effectiveness and minimize risk when it comes to 
utilizing OCS in contingency operations. The different joint staff positions provide key 
OCS-related duties while helping integrate contracted support. The duties by joint staff 
position, as listed in JP 4–10 (2014), are as follows:  
 J-1: Maintain CAAF accountability, in-theater reception; postal, MWR 
support; coordinate/consolidate human resource-related contract support 
requires. 
 J-2: Assist in collection and analysis of selected OCS related JIPOE 
information; contract company/personnel security vetting; OCS JIPOE 
information coordinate/consolidate intelligence related; contract support 
requirements (i.e., contracted interrogator/interpreter/translator support). 
 J-3: Chair/advise JRRB; plan and coordinate force protection (of contractors) 
and security (from contractors); establish CAAF training requirements; 
coordinate PR actions; plan for use of private security contractors to include 
RUF; contractor arming (for self-defense) policy. 
 J-4: Conduct logistic related planning/coordination; coordinate GFS; chair 
CLPSP. 
 J-5: Develop constraints; risk analysis. 
 J-6: Coordinate/consolidate signal contract requirements; contractor frequency 
allocation and management; IT security. 
 Comptroller: Funding planning/oversight; ensure correct funding streams; 
financial management planning; JRRB advisor; IFO lead coordinator. 
 Engineer: Coordinate land and facilities for contractors; construction 
classification/planning/quality surveillance oversight; coordinate /consolidate 
construction requirements. 
 Surgeon: Plan/coordinate CAAF medical support; operational specific pre-
deployment medical requirements. 
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 Staff Judge Advocate: Provide operational, contract, and fiscal law advice; 
advise as to the feasibility of asserting U.S. federal criminal jurisdiction over 
CAAF. 
 Provost Marshal: Investigate allegations of trafficking in persons, fraud, 
CAAF criminal activity; develop contractor base access policy/procedures. 
(JP 4–10, 2014).  
C. JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operational Planning (2011) describes the doctrine 
for conducting “joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full 
range of military operations” (JP 5–0, 2011). Through joint operational planning, national 
strategic objectives are transformed into actual activities for joint forces to accomplish to 
meet desired end states. Joint Operational Planning should include OCS planning, from 
the CSI function through the CM function.   
According to JP 5–0 (2011), there are six phases to joint operations, however, the 
six-phase model can be tailored to individual operations depending on the environment 
(e.g., the phases are not typically equal in length, and some phases may be skipped all 
together). The first phase is Phase 0, or the “shape” phase. During this phase, routine 
military activities are performed to deter potential threats and to maintain relationships 
with allies. In Phase I, the “deter” phase, a demonstration of capability is made and 
activities are undertaken to prepare forces for deployment in the event that the deterrence 
is not successful. The seize “initiative phase,” Phase II, is initiated when JFCs apply joint 
force capabilities to seize the initiative. When in Phase III, or the “dominate” phase, JFCs 
attempt to break the enemy’s will to resist, or control the operation. Moving into the 
“stabilize” phase, Phase IV, there is typically no legitimate civil governing body. The 
joint force may perform these activities or support other organizations or agencies in 
establishing a local functioning entity. Finally, during Phase V, the “enable civil 
authority” phase, joint forces support the new, legitimate civil authority (JP 5–0, 2011).   
OCS needs should be considered during each Joint Operation Planning phase. 
During Phase 0, contract-related boards, cells and working groups are established, and 
the OCS environment is analyzed. OCS planning typically includes market research on 
the local vendor base and the business climate within the region of concern. Further, 
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planning efforts may examine how OCS can shape the local environment. OCS can be 
used in lieu of large military operations during Phase 0, in order to meet force 
management levels while quelling political and social unrest. For example, contracts can 
be awarded to support the local populace in a highly unstable area that serves as a 
breeding ground for terrorism. Money funneled into the area through contracts may help 
rebuild the region, employing hundreds or thousands of locals and preventing fighting-
age males from resorting to terrorism/defecting to terrorist groups. Often times there are 
few to no military personnel present in these contracting-heavy operations.   
Phase I OCS activities may take the form of support to special operations forces 
(SOF), or establishing specific sustainment capabilities like staging for follow-on phases. 
Typically, the funding for a declared contingency is not available in this phase for heavy 
OCS-related activities, however deterrence forces still require contracted support, 
typically from local sources (non-CAAF). When Phase II occurs, theater support 
contracting provides services and commodities to support military forces. CAAF forces 
are likely to be deployed during these operations to provide support to the increasing 
number of troops on the ground.   
During Phase III, CAAF personnel continue to arrive to assist military forces in 
“dominating” the enemy. With the influx of CAAF personnel, there is an increased need 
for GFS to support and sustain those contractor personnel.   
In Phase IV, as stabilization occurs, OCS efforts expand to non-forces support, 
like security force assistance and reconstructing local infrastructure. Increased use of 
external support contracts to augment staffs occurs, and a formalized requirements 
review, validation, and approval process will be implemented to control the flow of 
contracted support in theater. Further, during this time, OCS actions must be fully 
coordinated with interagency partners and other nations, to synchronize plans and 
strategies. The rise of external support contracts typically increases the number of non-
CAAF personnel in the battle space. CAAF personnel, as described above start to arrive 
in theater as soon as Phase II, and continue to support boots on ground throughout the 
later phases. However, as the number of CAAF personnel increases, further external 
support from non-CAAF is typically required. Including non-CAAF for mission support 
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is more affordable than exclusively using CAAF personnel, and is less of a burden to 
support as the U.S. does not have to provide GFS for these contractors. However, 
affordability and ease of support must be balanced with security, as non-CAAF personnel 
are most often TCNs and LNs.   
Finally, in Phase V, controls are more stringent for new requirements, and a 
reduction of OCS occurs as contracts are closed out or eliminated (JP 4–10, 2014). The 
new civil authority takes over responsibility for security assistance, infrastructure 
reconstruction, and any other needs previously supplied via OCS.  
The marrying of Joint Operational Planning to OCS activities allows JFCs and 
operational commanders to understand what activities occur during different phases of 
military operations. Without understanding how OCS activities relate to Joint Operational 
Planning, or to the phases of military operations, it is difficult to utilize OCS effectively 
and efficiently. The activities planned or completed in one phase can drastically impact 
the outcomes of other phases. This theme is touched upon in the case studies and 
vignettes at all levels of JPME.   
D. INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER 
As stated in JP 4–10 (2014), “OCS actions, whether intended or not, can produce 
both positive and negative effects on the civil-military aspects of the overall campaign 
plan.” OCS affects both military operations and the environment in which the operations 
takes place, thus it is critical to understand the different implications of utilizing this 
powerful capability. More specifically, OCS can affect all of the instruments of national 
power, not just the military instrument. According to JP 1–0, Doctrine for the Armed 
Forces of the United States (2013), the “ability of the U.S. to advance its national 
interests is dependent on the effectiveness of the USG in employing the instruments of 
national power to achieve national strategic objectives.” The U.S. can deploy diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic instruments of power.   
The diplomatic instrument is the primary means for engaging with other 
countries, states, or foreign entities. Through this instrument, U.S. values and interests are 
promoted. Due to the business-related nature of OCS, it can impact diplomatic relations 
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by supporting (or not) the local economies of other nations. OCS can also be used to 
support the interests of US-friendly leaders, while the absence of OCS can have the 
opposite effect. If the award and execution of a contract goes positively, it can promote 
positive diplomatic relations between the foreign entity and the USG. However, if there 
are issues, the diplomatic relationship between the foreign state and the USG could sour, 
making future negotiations less amenable.   
The informational instrument of national power allows for communication and the 
extraction of information. OCS relates to this instrument, as a contract provides a 
medium for information exchange. Local contractors could pass on camp coordinates, 
facility locations, operational capabilities, etc., to adversaries of the USG. On the other 
side of the coin, OCS also allows the USG to “buy” information by supporting the local 
populace through contracts. For example, when a region is living in poverty, and the 
USG creates jobs in the area using contracts, the local population may start to sympathize 
with the USG. The benefit of these types of support contracts is that the local population 
may start to pass information to the U.S. to prevent attacks or issues with adversaries. 
Aligning U.S. interests with the interests of the local population enhances the flow of 
information to the benefit of the US.  
The military instrument of national power is used to fight and win the nation’s 
wars. While OCS is primarily associated with the military instrument of power, it has 
implications beyond just meeting military capability needs.   
The economic instrument of national power is fundamental to the general welfare 
of the USG. This instrument includes interactions with other nation’s economies and the 
international market. In a contingency environment, OCS can serve as an economic 
“weapon system” capable of producing both positive and negative effects. The contracts 
produced through OCS are a medium to pass large amounts of money (US dollar or local 
currency) to a local economy, thus creating jobs and enhancing money circulation. 
Depending on the US’ goals for the region, OCS can produce positive (e.g., build up the 
local economy) or negative (e.g., inflate the local economy) effects.  
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The instruments of national power can be positively or negatively affected by 
OCS, and commanders need to be aware of the implications of OCS on other national 
objectives. Specifically, the potential implications should be discussed and coordinated 
with partner agencies, such as the Department of State (diplomatic), the CIA 
(informational), the Department of Treasury (economic), and similar partner nation 
agencies. This theme is apparent throughout all case studies and vignettes developed for 
this project.   
The literature review explored themes derived from operational contract support 
doctrine, joint operational planning doctrine, and doctrine for the armed forces of the US. 
JP 4–10 (2014) outlines the major functions OCS, which include CSI, CS, and CM, and 
highlights how all staff functions are required to successfully implement OCS. The 
review of JP 5–0 (2011) demonstrates that operational planning should incorporate OCS. 
Just as military planners war-game scenarios, they should plan for how OCS will affect 
the battle space. Lastly, the instruments of national power from armed forces doctrine (JP 
1–0, 2013) substantiates the influence OCS has on all instruments of power, not just the 
military instrument. This literature supports the themes and conclusions that are 
emphasized in the case studies and vignettes. The next chapter explains how the case 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. CASE STUDY FORMAT AND PERSPECTIVE 
The formats of the case studies and vignettes vary to enhance learning at each 
JPME level. The formats of the associated teaching guides also vary to match the 
exercises or class discussion commensurate with each command level. The information in 
the teaching guides is not all encompassing, rather the guides represent a sample of 
possible questions and potential student responses.   
The intermediate JPME case study uses a format similar to a decision essay. The 
decision essay provides the decision options and criteria, as well as some critiques of 
other options and alternatives. Typically there will be substantial proof for the option 
recommended and an action plan will follow (Ellet, 2007, p. 136). The intermediate 
JPME case study, Camp Moore to Camp Landale (Appendix A), provides decision 
options and criteria, and many critiques of the alternative options. However, the 
recommendation and plan of action are left open-ended. This format helps the reader to 
view each alternative with equal consideration, which is a tactic staff officers and 
operational commanders should follow when making OCS decisions. Further, leaving the 
case study open-ended allows the audience to think critically about all potential 
consequences, without gaining any hindsight bias--this mimics how a commander would 
feel during a real world OCS scenario.   
The senior JPME case study, Funding the Enemy (Appendix B), follows a 
problem essay format. In this format, the problem is defined and diagnosed, and then 
information is given to show proof of causing the problem. Finally, an action plan is 
produced (Ellet, 2007, p. 119).   The benefit of this type of case writing is that it provides 
multiple effects and multiple causes, which helps to portray to the audience that OCS is 
multifaceted and can have multiple effects. However, the case for this command level 
does not include an action plan; instead, it allows the audience to think critically about 
their options and how they would personally react in the same situation. This is an 
important component, as the senior JPME audience is made up of O-5s and O-6s (GS-
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14/GS-15s)—these leaders are often faced with making difficult decisions like the one 
presented in the case.   
The FO/GO vignettes (Appendices C and D) did not follow a typical case study 
format. Instead, the vignettes provide a small story to illustrate a specific learning 
objective. This format is particularly effective for this level of command, because these 
senior officers rarely have time to review full length reports or audits. Often, these 
officers are simply briefed on a scenario before making a decision. Due to the nature of 
how these officers receive information and make analyses, this format is appropriate. 
Further, the expected time available for the FO/GO OCS lesson is 30 minutes--vignettes 
are specific enough to accommodate this time limit.    
B. CASE STUDY THEMES AND SUPPORTING JPME LEARNING 
OBJECTIVES 
The JPME OCS learning objectives published by the J4 OCSSD are tailored to 
challenge students at each level of JPME. In the paragraphs that follow, we outline the 
main themes of the case studies and vignettes derived from joint doctrine, and marry 
them to the JPME learning objectives. The deliverables for each level of command 
include OCS themes that the students are expected to internalize to enhance their 
effectiveness as operational commanders.      
1. Intermediate Case Study Themes and Supporting JPME OCS 
Learning Objectives 
The intermediate case study, Camp Moore to Camp Landale, has three doctrinal 
themes that connect to five JPME OCS learning objectives. These are not all the JPME 
OCS learning objectives for the intermediate level, rather the learning objectives that 
apply to the case.   
 Doctrinal Theme 1: Contract support integration, contracting support, and 
contractor management are the major functions of OCS that should be 
integrated into Joint Operational Planning to maximize OCS benefits and 
minimize risk to other tactical and strategic goals.   
o A.3. Explain Service, Service component, and joint force commanders’ 
OCS planning and execution responsibilities and considerations for 
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employment of contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) 
and non-CAAF to include discussing risk to mission and risk to force. 
o A.4. Explain how commanders control OCS through requirements 
determination by establishing and executing OCS-related boards, centers, 
and cells. 
o B.1. Comprehend the OCS implications within strategic and operational 
guidance, policy and procedures for planning (2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance, GEF, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan [JSCP], Joint 
Operational Planning and Execution System [JOPES]/Adaptive Planning 
and Execution [APEX], CJCSM 3130.03). 
o B.2. Explain contract support integration capabilities to integrate OCS 
requirements into operational plans and orders to include the role and 
function of OCS Integration Cells at the CCMD, Service component, and 
JTF levels. 
o B.4. Explain Service, agency, and joint force commander contractor 
management responsibilities for integrating contractors as an element of 
the Total Force to include theater entrance requirements, and in-theater 
accountability, oversight, visibility, and the provision of government 
furnished support (GFS). 
 Doctrinal Theme 2: Every joint function has a role in planning, integrating, 
and managing OCS.  
o Same as B.2. and B.4. above. 
 
 Doctrinal Theme 3:  OCS is a capability that can influence and create effects 
on the instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and 
economic. 
o Same as B.1. above.  
These themes, derived from JP 1–0, JP 4–10, and JP 5–0, illustrate to a mid-level 
officer how OCS activities go beyond meeting operational needs and how to effectively 
manage this capability.   
2. Senior Case Study Themes and Supporting JPME OCS Learning 
Objectives 
The senior case study, Funding the Enemy, has two doctrinal themes that connect 
to ten JPME OCS learning objectives. These are not all the JPME OCS learning 
objectives for the senior level, rather the learning objectives that apply to the case.   
 Doctrinal Theme 1: There are benefits, risks, costs, and other considerations 
when including contractors as part of the total joint force.  
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o C.1. Analyze the evolution, purpose, principles, and challenges of OCS in 
enabling joint force operations. 
o D.2. Examine the strategic and operational planning and execution 
implications of using external versus theater support contracts. 
o E.1. Comprehend how to leverage joint, Service, and agency OCS 
capabilities to support commanders and staffs to enhance operational 
effects, manage the requirements determination process, and avoid 
unintended consequences. 
o E.3. Assess the strategic effects of the infusion of large amounts of 
financial capital into a struggling economy (e.g., USFOR-A TF 2010) 
across the gamut of political, diplomatic, military, or economic power 
bases; include in the assessment OCS interagency implications (focus on 
the DoJ, DoS, and DoC in addition to DOD). 
o G.3. Comprehend legal, oversight, ethical, and cultural issues related to 
use of contractors in an operational setting. 
o G.4. Interpret the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and 
procurement integrity for the Department. 
 Doctrinal Theme 2: OCS can affect strategic goals and outcomes; proper 
cross-functional planning should be incorporated during Phase 0, or as early 
as possible, to prevent unintended consequences.  
o C.3. Interpret strategic implications of substituting contracted capability 
for forces in national security missions across the full range of military 
operations and include an analysis of the benefits, risks, costs, and 
considerations (to include implications of “inherently governmental” as 
defined in Section 5 of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act) for 
the Total Force. 
o Same as D.2. above.  
o D.3. Examine how private sector capability has adapted to changing 
strategic and operational environments to include an analysis of how 
resourcing and prioritization affect national strategies and operational 
options. 
o D.4. Examine a commander’s options to achieve effects by considering 
resource management (e.g., integrated financial operations, formally 
known as “money as a weapon system”) and efforts such as the 
commander’s emergency response program (CERP) in OCS planning. 
o E.1. Comprehend how to leverage joint, Service, and agency OCS 
capabilities to support commanders and staffs to enhance operational 
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effects, manage the requirements determination process, and avoid 
unintended consequences. 
These themes depict to senior-level strategic thinkers how OCS can serve as a 
war-fighting capability that needs to be properly planned, managed, and maintained to 
achieve strategic outcomes.   
3. The FO/GO Case Study Themes and Supporting JPME OCS 
Learning Objectives 
The FO/GO vignettes have two doctrinal themes that connect to four JPME OCS 
learning objectives. These are not all the JPME OCS learning objectives for the FO/GO 
level, rather the learning objectives that apply to the vignettes.   
 Doctrinal Theme 1: There are benefits, risks, costs, and other considerations 
when including contractors as part of the total joint force.  
o E.3. Assess the strategic effects of the infusion of large amounts of 
financial capital into a struggling economy (e.g., USFOR-A TF 2010) 
across the gamut of political, diplomatic, military, or economic power 
bases; include in the assessment OCS interagency implications (focus on 
the DoJ, DoS, and DoC in addition to DOD). 
o F.3. Evaluate strategic implications of substituting contracted capability 
for forces in national security missions across the full range of military 
operations; include an analysis of the benefits, risks, costs, and 
considerations for the Total Force. 
 Doctrinal Theme 2: OCS can affect strategic goals and outcomes; proper 
cross-functional planning should be incorporated during Phase 0, or as early 
as possible,  to prevent unintended consequences.  
o G.4. Assess the importance of maintaining high ethical standards and 
procurement integrity for the Department. 
o G.5. Assess cost consciousness and how to achieve effectiveness and 
economy of operation as they relate to employing OCS by considering the 
following: 
 Contracting related boards and theater business clearance (TBC) 
 Competition for scarce local resources 
 Achieving economies of scale by combining or coordinating 
requirements 
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 Managing government-furnished support 
 Effects on other, less tangible costs of contracted support (e.g., CORs, 
escorts, opportunity costs, increased risks, loss of flexibility). 
These themes illustrate to flag and general officers the criticality of early planning 
of OCS activities and the impact that OCS can have on high level strategic interests.   
C. COLLABORATION 
The case studies and vignettes were developed through research and collaboration 
with subject matter experts from the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4) OCSSD. Drafts 
of the case studies and vignettes were submitted to the J4 OCSSD staff for feedback in 
order to enhance the materials’ effectiveness in the JPME environment. Further, feedback 
was sought on the teaching guides and on which learning objectives to address. This 
collaborative effort helped create end products designed to meet the intent of the JPME 
learning objectives and the CJCS guidelines.   
The case studies and vignettes were developed in the style that best enhanced 
learning at each JPME level. Further, each case study and vignette had themes derived 
from doctrine that were supported by the learning objectives of each JPME level’s 
required curricula.   This methodology satisfies the JPME schools at a tactical level, as 
well as the DOD at a strategic level.   Lastly, the case studies and vignettes as well as 
their teaching guides were reviewed by the J4, OCSSD to ensure the material 
encompassed the right lessons and critical thinking required to train current and future 
operational commanders on OCS. These methods created the actual case studies and 





IV. RESULTS (CASE STUDIES AND VIGNETTES) 
A. INTERMEDIATE CASE STUDY AND TEACHING GUIDE 
The intermediate case study can be found in Appendix A and focuses on tactical 
and operational OCS execution. The associated teaching guide contains three exercises to 
emphasize the learning objectives for this level of JPME. The exercises are modular, and 
allow the instructor maximum flexibility to guide the discussion in ways that meet the 
learning objectives while taking into account time constraints. The first exercise focuses 
on the major functions of OCS: contract support integration, contracting support, and 
contractor management. The second exercise encourages students to brainstorm how 
different joint functions are integrated into OCS. The last exercise is more strategic in 
nature and is a discussion of how OCS can influence the instruments of national power.   
B. SENIOR CASE STUDY AND TEACHING GUIDE 
The senior case study, found in Appendix B, takes an operational commander 
perspective and focuses on the strategic effects of OCS. The senior case study teaching 
guide provides discussion questions that encourage students to think critically about how 
OCS can assist--or undermine—the achievement of strategic goals.   
C. FO/GO VIGNETTES AND TEACHING GUIDES 
The FO/GO vignettes, found in Appendices C and D, take specific events and 
emphasize associated learning objectives. The FO/GO teaching guide provides discussion 
questions that encourage students to think critically about how OCS can be an economic 
“weapon” in the nation’s warfighting arsenal and should be taken into account in all 
phases of strategic planning and execution.    
The results of this research were the actual case studies and vignettes developed 
for use in JPME curricula. Case studies were developed for the intermediate and senior 
JPME levels, while short vignettes were developed for the FO/GO level. In addition, 
teaching guides were created to facilitate the learning from these case studies and 
vignettes. While this research encompasses many themes and lessons of OCS, there is 
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still an opportunity to add to this collection of work and to provide a wide array of 






The case studies and vignettes should be tested in an academic environment prior 
to full implementation in the JPME curriculum. Testing of the intermediate-level case 
study could occur at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, as the Naval War College 
offers JPME I certification at this location. This setting would provide a comparable 
range of students for the intermediate JPME case study, in terms of service and career-
field diversity. Further, this testing would allow proctors to gauge how effective the 
material is, in terms of achieving the desired outcomes. The students would also be able 
to provide feedback to improve the cases, exercises, and class discussions. Testing of the 
senior-level case study and the FO/GO-level vignettes should be performed at other 
available JPME schools. 
B. FUTURE PRODUCTS 
Future case studies and vignettes should be developed to highlight OCS 
successes, best practices, and/or failures in current events to enhance applicability to real 
world changes in the operational environment. The case studies and vignettes are living 
documents that can and should be tailored to the changing landscape. The current case 
studies and vignettes can be modified, or new case studies and vignettes can be 
developed, to create a comprehensive collection of materials for JPME instructors to 
choose from, based upon their teaching goals.   
C. FEEDBACK 
Feedback is recommended throughout the useful life of the case studies and 
vignettes. Feedback from any user, student, instructor, observer, etc., is encouraged in 
order to update and further the academic integrity and effectiveness of the case studies 
and vignettes. Feedback may be sent to the Acquisition and Contracting Area Chair at the 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA 93943.   
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VI. SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS 
1. Supplement. OCS Teaching Guide: Intermediate JPME 
This supplement may be accessed by permission only. Access is restricted to 
JPME instructors, employees of the J4, Logistics Directorate, and U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School faculty. To access this document please contact the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School library.   
2. Supplement.  OCS Teaching Guide: Senior JPME 
This supplement may be accessed by permission only. Access is restricted to 
JPME instructors, employees of the J4, Logistics Directorate, and U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School faculty. To access this document please contact the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School library.   
3. Supplement.  OCS Teaching Guide: FO/GO JPME Vignette 1 
This supplement may be accessed by permission only. Access is restricted to 
JPME instructors, employees of the J4, Logistics Directorate, and U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School faculty. To access this document please contact the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School library.   
4. Supplement.  OCS Teaching Guide: FO/GO JPME Vignette 2 
This supplement may be accessed by permission only. Access is restricted to 
JPME instructors, employees of the J4, Logistics Directorate, and U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School faculty. To access this document please contact the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School library.   
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